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Abstract 
A disruption in the sense of agency is the primary phenomenological feature of response to hypnotic 
suggestions but its cognitive basis remains elusive. Here we tested the proposal that distorted volition 
during response to suggestions arises from poor metacognition pertaining to the sources of one’s control. 
Highly suggestible and control participants completed a motor task in which performance was reduced 
through surreptitious manipulations of cursor lag and stimuli speed. Highly suggestible participants did 
not differ from controls in performance or metacognition of performance, but their sense of agency was 
less sensitive to cursor lag manipulations, suggesting reduced awareness that their control was being 
manipulated. These results indicate that highly suggestible individuals have aberrant metacognition of 
agency and may be a valuable population for studying distortions in the sense of agency. 
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1. Introduction 
The primary phenomenological feature of a response to a hypnotic suggestion is the perception that one is 
not the author of one’s actions or experience (Oakley & Halligan, 2013). This disruption of one’s sense of 
agency is reliably observed in highly suggestible (HS) individuals, who comprise 10-15% of the 
population (Woody & Barnier, 2008). The magnitude of these disruptions closely parallels those of 
patients with schizophrenia (Polito, Langdon, & Barnier, 2015), indicating that HS individuals may be 
valuable in identifying the neurocognitive bases of distortions in the sense of agency (Terhune, 
Cleeremans, Raz, & Lynn, in press).  
The mechanisms underlying response to suggestion and distorted volition among HS individuals are 
poorly understood but multiple theories converge on the hypothesis that distorted sense of agency during 
hypnotic responding arises from a disruption of meta-awareness. Different models have proposed that 
hypnotic responding is driven by cognitive control that is experienced as extra-volition because of a 
disruption of executive monitoring (Dienes & Perner, 2007; Hilgard, 1977; Kunzendorf, 1985-86; Miller, 
Galanter, & Pribram, 1960) (see also Kirsch & Lynn, 1998; Spanos, 1986). One theory has specifically 
hypothesized that responses to suggestion are facilitated by a disruption of meta-awareness of intentions 
pertaining to one’s responses (Dienes & Perner, 2007). 
Multiple lines of evidence offer support for an involvement of aberrant metacognition in high 
hypnotic suggestibility. Hypnotic suggestibility is negatively associated with mindfulness and meditators 
display reduced or average hypnotic suggestibility (Semmens-Wheeler & Dienes, 2012; Spanos, Steggles, 
Radtke-Bodorik, & Rivers, 1979). Meditators seem to have greater awareness of motor intentions (Jo, 
Hinterberger, Wittmann, & Schmidt, 2015) whereas HS individuals seem to have delayed awareness of 
such intentions (Lush, Naish, & Dienes, 2016). Reducing meta-awareness may also enhance 
suggestibility (Brown, Antonova, Langley, & Oakley, 2001). Finally, HS individuals display reduced 
prefrontal activity or prefrontal functional connectivity either at baseline or following a hypnotic 
induction (Jamieson & Burgess, 2014; McGeown, Mazzoni, Venneri, & Kirsch, 2009; Terhune, Cardeña, 
& Lindgren, 2011), including in medial prefrontal regions that have been implicated in metacognition of 
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agency (Miele, Wager, Mitchell, & Metcalfe, 2011). Nevertheless, the prediction that metacognition 
pertaining to one’s sense of agency is diminished in HS individuals has not yet been directly tested. 
In this study we tested the prediction that high hypnotic suggestibility is characterized by reduced 
metacognition of agency. HS participants and controls completed a motor control task in which 
performance was disrupted through surreptitious manipulations related (cursor lag), and unrelated (stimuli 
speed), to motor control (Metcalfe & Greene, 2007; Metcalfe, Van Snellenberg, DeRosse, Balsam, & 
Malhotra, 2012). They were presented with descending visual stimuli and attempted to capture targets and 
avoid non-targets using a moving cursor and subsequently judged their performance and control. Previous 
research showed that sense of agency in patients with schizophrenia was less sensitive to cursor lag 
manipulations than in controls (Metcalfe et al., 2012), suggesting impaired metacognition of agency. On 
the basis of the phenomenological similarity of distorted agency in patients with schizophrenia and HS 
individuals (Polito et al., 2015), we expected that the latter group’s sense of agency would be similarly 
less sensitive to manipulations of cursor lag, but not of stimuli speed, relative to controls. 
 
2. Methods 
2.1. Participants 
74 right-handed individuals (MAge=24.5, SE=0.8; 48 females; years of post-secondary education: 3.6±0.3) 
consented to participate in this study in accordance with local ethical approval. We expected an effect size 
for the primary group difference in the within-participant regression analyses to be similar to that of a 
previous study on patients with schizophrenia (ds=0.96-1.17; Metcalfe et al., 2012) and so we made a 
conservative estimate of d=0.8. Assuming a two tailed α=.05 and 1-β=.90 and an allocation ratio of 2:1 
(approximately twice as many controls as HS participants), this amounted to a required sample size of 62 
participants. We collected data past this number to increase statistical power and account for the possible 
omission of participants (none were omitted from the final sample); we ceased data collection once a 
certain time point in the academic calendar had been reached. Participants were recruited randomly from 
a larger sample (N=617) that had previously undergone testing for hypnotic suggestibility. 
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2.2. Materials and Procedure 
Hypnotic suggestibility was measured with the Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility: Form A 
(HGSHS:A; Shor & Orne, 1962), a widely-used, group-administered behavioral measure of hypnotic 
suggestibility. This scale has been extensively validated (Woody & Barnier, 2008) and exhibited 
acceptable internal consistency (Cronbach’s α=.67). The scale consists of a relaxation-based hypnotic 
induction and 12 suggestions of varying difficulty. Representative items include facilitative motor (e.g., 
arm heaviness), inhibitory motor (e.g., arm paralysis), and inhibitory cognitive (e.g., posthypnotic 
amnesia) suggestions. Participants rate their responsiveness to each suggestion based on overt behavioral 
responses and responsiveness to each item is scored dichotomously. Summary scores range from 0 to 12 
with scores in the range of 9-12 reflecting high hypnotic suggestibility.  
The Metacognition of Agency Task (Metcalfe & Greene, 2007; Metcalfe et al., 2012) indexed the 
extent to which participants were aware that their motor control had been manipulated. Each trial 
consisted of 54 stimuli (the letters X and O; Arial, white font, font size 20; 27 each) descending from the 
top to the bottom of the monitor (see Figure 1). A grey horizontal track (1cm tall) that stretched across 
the monitor 20cm from the bottom included a superimposed 1×1cm cursor (white square) that was 
controlled by the mouse. Participants were instructed to capture targets (Xs) using the cursor, whilst 
avoiding non-targets (Os) and received performance feedback (32ms auditory tone; high pitch [5000Hz] 
for correct responses; low pitch [1000Hz] for incorrect responses) (for further details, see (Metcalfe, Eich, 
& Castel, 2010)). We manipulated two variables: Stimuli speed (8 v. 10 pixels per frame rate [slow v. fast 
conditions, respectively]) and Cursor lag (0 v. 3 v. 6 frame rates of delay of mouse movements [control 
(0ms) v. short lag (50ms) v. long lag (100ms) conditions, respectively]). Participants were not pre-
informed about these manipulations. Trials took approximately 28-34s to complete. After each trial, 
participants rated their performance (Judgments of Performance [JOPs]; from poor to perfect) and control 
(Judgments of Agency [JOAs]; from no control to completely in control) using visual analogue scales (0 
to 1) on the monitor.  
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Figure 1. Metacognition of Agency Task (MAT). Participants moved a cursor (white square) along a 
horizontal track in order to capture descending targets (Xs) and avoid descending non-targets (Os). 
Stimuli speed and cursor lag were surreptitiously manipulated on different trials to disrupt performance 
(see Method). 
 
 Participants completed the HGSHS:A and MAT on separate days. The experimenter administering 
the MAT was masked to participants’ HGSHS:A scores and participants were naïve to the hypotheses 
under test, ensuring a double-blind design. Prior to the task, video/computer gaming experience was 
evaluated on a 7-point Likert scale (1: never, 2: a few times, 3: more than a few times, 4: once in a while, 
5: many times, 6: regularly, 7: daily) (data were missing for one participant). The MAT was completed on 
a PC using a rotatable DELL LED display (1920×1200 pixels, 56×36cm; refresh rate: 60Hz) at a distance 
of 70cm with the monitor in the vertical orientation. Stimulus presentation and response collection was 
implemented with Psychtoolbox (Brainard, 1997; Kleiner, Brainard, & Pelli, 2007) for MATLAB® 
(2014a, MathWorks, Natick, MA). Participants completed two practice trials followed by 30 experimental 
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trials with each combination of Stimuli speed (2 levels) and Cursor lag (3 levels) occurring with random 
presentation in five blocks of 6 trials. After completing the task, participants were asked whether they had 
noticed the lag (scored dichotomously: yes or no) and to estimate the frequency of trials on which a lag 
was present (0-100%). 
 
2.3. Analyses.  
Raw data are available in the Supplementary Material. The dependent variables included performance 
measures (d´, hit rates [proportion of “caught” targets] and false alarm rates [proportion of “caught” non-
targets]) and metacognition measures (JOPs and JOAs). Data were analysed using MATLAB and SPSS® 
(v. 22, IBM) with 2 (Speed: slow vs. fast) × 3 (Lag: control vs. short vs. long) × 2 (Group: controls vs. HS 
participants) mixed-model ANOVAs. Greenhouse-Geisser corrections were applied when data violated 
the assumption of sphericity. Subsidiary analyses used univariate Welch ANOVAs or t-tests because of 
the uneven ratio of participants in the two groups (uncorrected dfs are reported). We estimated confidence 
intervals for effect sizes (η2 and robust Cohen’s d; Algina, Keselman, & Penfield, 2005) using bootstrap 
resampling (10,000 samples; bias-corrected and accelerated method; Efron, 1987). Within-participant 
regression analyses were performed in which JOAs were regressed on d´, JOPs, Stimuli speed, and 
Cursor lag (Metcalfe et al., 2012); group comparisons of individual beta coefficients were subsequently 
done using Welch t-tests. On the basis of research suggesting that HS participants constitute a discrete 
group (Oakman & Woody, 1996), the primary analyses treated Hypnotic suggestibility as a categorical 
variable. Nevertheless, we supplement all critical effects with Spearman, point biserial, or partial 
Spearman correlations in which Hypnotic suggestibility is treated as a continuous variable, computed 
using the Robust Correlation Toolbox in MATLAB (Pernet, Wilcox, & Rousselet, 2012); in all cases, the 
categorical and continuous analyses converge. All analyses were two-tailed. 
We also used Bayesian statistics to contrast group differences (HS participants – controls [∆HS]) with 
those between patients with schizophrenia and controls (patients – controls [∆SZ]; Metcalfe et al., 2012) 
or other group differences in our data. In particular, we examined: 1) whether ∆HS in JOPs differed from 
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∆SZ in JOPs; 2) whether ∆HS in JOAs differed from ∆HS in JOPs; and 3) whether ∆HS in cursor lag beta 
coefficients (predicting JOAs) differed from ∆SZ beta coefficients. Toward this end, we computed Bayes 
factors (BFs) in MATLAB (Dienes, 2008, 2011) for group differences using ∆SZ or ∆HS values as priors. 
BFs index the likelihood that data favor the alternative or null hypothesis and are thereby especially 
informative in the interpretation of non-significant p-values from orthodox statistical tests (Dienes, 2014). 
The theoretical range of BFs extends from 0 to ∞, with values less than or greater than 1 reflecting 
evidence for or against the null hypothesis, respectively. BFs less than 0.33 are typically interpreted as 
providing substantial evidence for the null hypothesis, those greater than 3 as providing substantial 
evidence for the alternative, and those between 0.33 and 3 as being insensitive in distinguishing between 
the two (Dienes, 2011; Jeffreys, 1961). In each case, BFs were calculated with the group effect (∆HS: 
M±SE) contrasted against the respective prior specified as a normal distribution, BFN(M, SD), where M=∆ 
and SD=SE(∆) (the use of a default SD=M/2 yielded comparable results in all but one case), because a 
hypothesis maintaining that the effects are comparable predicts that near-zero values are unlikely (Dienes, 
2014). 
 
3. Results 
3.1. Demographic information 
HGSHS:A scores ranged from 0 to 11, with a mean (±SE) of 6.4±0.3, thereby encompassing a broad 
range of levels of hypnotic suggestibility. We contrasted HS participants (n=16; HGSHS:A: 9.50±0.18) 
against the remainder of the sample (henceforth controls; n=58; HGSHS:A: 5.52±2.24). The two groups 
did not significantly differ in age (controls: 24.5±0.3; HS: 24.4±0.4), t(72)=0.03, p=.98, d=0.13 [-0.23, 
0.48], gender (female:male ratios; controls: 39:19; HS: 9:7), χ2 (1)=0.67, p=0.42, φ=.09 [.00, .31], years 
of post-secondary education (controls: 3.7±0.3; HS: 2.9±0.4), t(72)=1.44, p=.16, d=0.38 [0.05, 0.72], or 
video/computer gaming experience (controls: 2.4±0.2; HS: 2.4±0.4), t(71)=0.17, p=.86, d=0.19 [-0.11, 
0.51]. 
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3.2. Task performance 
A 2 (Speed) × 3 (Lag) × 2 (Group) mixed-model ANOVA on d´ values revealed large main effects of 
Speed, F(1,72)=232.42, p<.001, ηp2=.76 [.66, .82], and Lag, F(2,144)=261.19, p<.001, ηp2=.78 [.72, .82], 
reflecting declines in performance as the magnitude of each manipulation increased (see Figure 2a). In 
addition, there was a small Speed × Lag interaction, F(2,144)=3.86, p=.023, ηp2=.05 [.00, .13], reflecting 
a greater detrimental influence of Speed on performance in the short lag condition (η2s: control: .63 [.49, 
.72], short: .68 [.55, .75], long: .65 [.51, .73]). By contrast, there was no significant effect of Group, 
F(1,72)=0.02, p=.88, ηp2<.01 [.00, .01], rs=.07, p=.58 [-.17, .29], or any other significant effects, Fs<1.7, 
ps>.2, ηp2s<.03. 
The analysis of hit rates similarly revealed large main effects of Speed, F(1,72)=508.37, p<.001, 
ηp2=.88 [.82, .91], and Lag, F(2,144)=563.88, p<.001, ηp2=.89 [.85, .91], which were qualified by a small 
Speed × Lag interaction, F(2,144)=5.98, p=.003, ηp2=.08 [.01, .16], reflecting a decline in the influence of 
Speed as Lag increased (η2s: control: .85 [.78, .88], short: .80 [.72, .85], long: .72 [.60, .78]), but no other 
significant effects, Fs<1.1, ps>.35, ηp2s<.02 (see Figure 2b). By contrast, there were no significant effects 
on false alarm rates, Fs<2.3, ps>.11, which were uniformly low (see Figure 2c). Neither hit rates, rs=.05, 
p=.70 [-.18, .26], nor false alarm rates, rs=-.03, p=.78 [-.26, .20], significantly correlated with Hypnotic 
suggestibility. These analyses demonstrate that performance declined with increased cursor lag, as 
previously observed (Metcalfe & Greene, 2007; Metcalfe et al., 2012), and stimuli speed, but that 
performance was not significantly related to hypnotic suggestibility.  
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Figure 2. Performance and metacognitive judgments in the Metacognition of Agency Task (MAT). (a) d´, 
(b) hit rates, (c) false alarm rates, (d) Judgments of Performance (JOPs), and (e) Judgments of Agency 
(JOAs) as a function of Stimuli speed (slow v. fast), Cursor lag (control v. short v. long), and Group 
(control v. highly suggestible [HS]). (e) Beta coefficients for individual predictors (d´, JOP, Stimuli 
speed, and Cursor lag) in within-participant regression analyses on JOAs as a function of Group. 
** p<.01 
 
3.3. Judgments of Performance (JOPs) 
As can be seen in Figure 2d, there were large main effects of Speed, F(1,72)=91.76, p<.001, ηp2=.56 [.40, 
.66] and Lag, F(2,144)=145.35, p<.001, ηp2=.67 [.58, .73], on JOPs, reflecting self-perceived performance 
declines with increases in the magnitude of experimental manipulations, but no significant effect of 
Group, F(1,72)=0.18, p=.68, ηp2<.01 [.00, .07], rs=.12, p=.12 [-.07, .41], and no other significant effects, 
Fs<1.3, ps>.27, ηp2s<.02. Bayesian analyses testing the hypothesis that JOP group differences (∆HS: 
control: .003±.041; short lag: .021±.040; long lag: .020±.040) were comparable to patient-group 
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differences (∆SZ) (Metcalfe et al., 2012) yielded clear evidence for the null hypothesis (control: BFN(.08, 
.06)=0.32; short lag: BFN(.11, .05)=0.27; long lag: BFN(.12,.05)=0.21). This indicates that group differences in 
JOPs were lower than those between patients and controls and suggest that HS participants’ JOPs were 
dissimilar from those of patients with schizophrenia. These results suggest that JOPs closely parallel 
behavioral performance patterns and do not relate to Hypnotic suggestibility.  
 
3.4. Judgments of Agency (JOAs) 
JOAs similarly declined with task manipulations (Figure 2e), as reflected in main effects of Speed, 
F(1,72)=43.37, p<.001, ηp2=.38 [.20, .51], and Lag, F(2,144)=119.91, p<.001, ηp2=.63 [.53, .69], which 
were qualified by a Speed × Lag interaction, F(2,144)=5.32, p=.006, ηp2=.07 [.01, .15], which reflected a 
smaller effect of Speed in the control condition (ηp2s: control: .10 [.01, .24], short: .34 [.17, .48], long: .27 
[.11, .42]). The effect of Speed on JOAs replicates a previous study observing the same effect (Vuorre & 
Metcalfe, 2016). The Lag effect was further moderated by the predicted Lag × Group interaction, 
F(2,144)=8.57, p=.001, ηp2=.11 [.02, .20]. Relative to controls, HS participants reported greater JOAs in 
the long lag condition, F(1,72)=7.57, p=.012, η2=.11 [.01, .25], rs=.43, p<.001 [.20, .61], but the two 
groups did not significantly differ in the control, F(1,72)=0.20, p=.66, η2=.00 [.00, .07], rs=-.06, p=.59 [-
.30, .19], or in the short lag, F(1,72)=1.55, p=.22, η2=.02 [.00, .11], rs=.19, p=.10 [-.04, .40], conditions. 
All other effects were non-significant, Fs<1.7, ps>.2, ηp2s<.03.   
We next examined the specificity of the differential lag effect across groups on JOAs, namely 
whether it was different from the corresponding non-significant group effect on JOPs. Toward this end, 
we repeated the analyses on Judgments, collapsing across Speeds and including Judgment type (JOP v. 
JOA) as a repeated-measures independent variable. This analysis replicated the foregoing effects but also 
revealed a Judgment type × Lag × Group interaction, F(2,144)=7.46, p=.002, ηp2=.09 [.02, .18]. The 
Judgment type × Group interaction, reflecting a greater Group discrepancy in the difference between 
JOAs and JOPs, was restricted to the long lag condition (control: F(1,72)=0.30, p=.58, ηp2<.01 [.00, .08]; 
short lag: F(1,72)=0.72, p=.40, ηp2=.01 [.00, .10]; long lag: F(1,72)=8.86, p=.004, ηp2=.11 [.01, .25]). This 
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indicates that the difference between JOAs and JOPs was larger in HS participants, but only in the long 
lag condition. Bayesian analyses contrasting group differences in JOAs (∆HS-JOA) against the 
corresponding difference in JOPs (∆HS-JOP) further corroborated these differential effects. Although the 
data in the control, -.020±.044, BFN(.003, .041)=0.75, and short lag, .051±.041, BFN(.021, .040)=1.35, conditions 
were inconclusive, ∆HS-JOA in the long lag condition, .130±.047, was larger than ∆HS-JOP, BFN(.020, 
.040)=7.13. Thus, the magnitude of JOA group differences was larger than that for JOP group differences 
but only in the long lag condition. These results indicate that JOAs declined with increased task 
manipulations, in a parallel fashion to JOPs and behavioural performance, but that HS participants 
reported selectively greater control, but not performance, in the high cursor lag condition, when 
performance was lowest. This suggests that HS participants’ sense of agency is less sensitive to 
manipulations of control.  
 
3.5. Regression analyses 
We next sought to determine whether poorer metacognition of agency in HS participants was independent 
of performance and metacognition of performance. We expected that even when performance, JOPs, and 
Stimuli speed were considered, cursor lag manipulations would still have less influence on JOAs in HS 
participants, as previously observed in patients with schizophrenia (Metcalfe et al., 2012). To test this 
hypothesis, we submitted data to within-participant regression analyses in which JOAs were regressed on 
d´, JOPs, Stimuli speed, and Lag (Metcalfe, Eich, & Miele, 2013; Metcalfe et al., 2012). Across groups, 
mean (unstandardized) beta coefficients were significantly different from 0 for d´ (.03±.01), t(73)=3.33, 
p=.001, d=0.39 [0.16 0.63], JOPs (.43±.04), t(73)=10.35, p<.001, d=1.20 [0.93, 1.58], and Lag (-
.04±.003), t(73)=10.63, p<.001, d=1.24 [1.04, 1.51], thereby replicating both the magnitude and direction 
of these coefficients as observed in previous studies (Metcalfe et al., 2013; Metcalfe et al., 2012). In 
contrast, beta coefficients for Stimuli speed did not significantly differ from 0 (-.004±.003), t(73)=1.42, 
p=.16, d=0.16 [-0.06, 0.40]. These results indicate that JOAs were higher when d´ and JOPs were higher, 
but lower when the Lag was longer, and were not reliably related to Stimuli speed. 
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We expected that Lag beta coefficients would be closer to 0 in HS participants than in controls, 
indicating that their sense of agency is less sensitive to manipulations of motor control, but that the two 
groups would not exhibit differential betas for the other predictors (Metcalfe et al., 2012). In support of 
this prediction, Lag beta coefficients were closer to 0 in HS participants than in controls, t(72)=2.93, 
p=.006, d=0.67 [0.40, 0.98], rs=.32, p=.006 [.09, .50], (see Figure 2f), whereas the two groups did not 
significantly differ in beta coefficients for d´, t(72)=0.31, p=.76, d=0.25 [-0.17, 0.67]), rs=.08, p=.49 [-.16, 
.31], JOPs, t(72)=0.51, p=.61, d=0.06 [-0.32, 0.44]), rs=.05, p=.65 [-.17, .27], or Stimuli speed, 
t(72)=0.29, p=.77, d=0.05 [-0.29, 0.38]), rs=-.06, p=.61 [-.28, .16]. Bayesian analyses testing the 
hypothesis that the group difference (∆HS) in lag beta coefficients (.019±.006) was similar to two 
corresponding patient-control differences (∆SZ) (Metcalfe et al., 2012) yielded support for the null 
hypothesis for one difference (∆SZ: short lag vs. control; BFN(.25, .06)=0.01) but insensitive results for the 
second difference (∆SZ: long lag vs. control; BFN(.17, .08)=1.91)1. These results indicate that HS 
participants’ sense of agency is selectively less sensitive to cursor lag manipulations, suggesting impaired 
metacognition of agency, although the data were insensitive in assessing whether this group difference 
was of comparable magnitude to those observed between patients with schizophrenia and controls.  
 
3.6. Lag awareness and estimated frequency 
Ninety-two percent of participants detected the cursor lag, with no significant group differences (controls: 
91%; HS participants: 94%; Fisher’s exact p=1.0, φ=0.04 [.00, .11], rs=.03, p=.83 [-.19, .27]. Across 
groups, participants underestimated the frequency of the lag (46%±2.5; objective: 67%, t=8.30, p<.001, 
d=0.97 [.75, 1.24]), with estimated lag frequency not significantly differing between groups (controls: 
45%±2.9; HS participants: 52%±4.4), t(72)=1.34, p=.19, d=0.20 [-0.10, 0.52], rs=-.11, p=.36 [-.33, .13]. 
In order to determine whether these variables influenced metacognition of agency, we repeated the 
between-group contrast of Lag beta coefficients in an ANCOVA including Estimated lag frequency as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Our results are not directly comparable to those of Metcalfe et al. (2012) and thus these results should be 
interpreted with caution: Metcalfe et al. (2012) dummy-coded the two different lags and treated them as two binary 
predictors whereas we included lag as a single 3-level categorical predictor. 
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covariate. The main effect of Group remained significant, F(1,71)=7.78, p=.007, ηp2=.10 [.01, .24], 
rps=.30, p=.010, [.06, .50], replicating the result that HS participants’ beta coefficients were nearer to 0 
than controls. In addition, there was a comparably-sized main effect of Estimated lag frequency, 
F(1,71)=7.75, p=.007, ηp2=.10 [.01, .24], reflecting a negative association, rs=-.30, p=.009 [-.50, -.08]. 
These data indicate that metacognition of agency was independently lower in HS participants and in those 
who underestimated the frequency of the lag. 
 
4. Discussion 
Highly suggestible individuals did not differ from controls in motor control or in metacognition of 
performance but reported greater sense of agency when control was disrupted by a temporal lag on their 
motor output. Further analyses demonstrated that highly suggestible individuals’ sense of agency was less 
predictable from the cursor lag than that of controls and that this group difference was independent of a 
number of relevant parameters including behavioural performance, metacognition of performance, 
manipulation of stimuli speed, and estimated lag frequency. In addition, the effects were stable 
irrespective of whether or not hypnotic suggestibility was treated as a binary or continuous measure. 
These results indicate that highly suggestible individuals’ sense of agency is less sensitive to 
manipulations of their perceived control and thereby support the proposal that high hypnotic 
suggestibility is characterized by a disruption of meta-awareness (Dienes & Perner, 2007; Hilgard, 1977; 
Kunzendorf, 1985-86; Spanos, 1986). In particular, highly suggestible individuals may have failed to 
detect the impact of the lag on their control because of a delay in their awareness of when they initiated 
their motor responses (Lush et al., 2016). Impaired metacognition may facilitate hypnotic suggestibility 
by reducing accessibility of intentions associated with responses to suggestions (Dienes & Perner, 2007), 
giving rise to the perceived loss of authorship over one’s responses (Bowers, 1981; Polito et al., 2015; 
Walsh, Oakley, Halligan, Mehta, & Deeley, 2015; Weitzenhoffer, 1974). 
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Highly suggestible individuals displayed the same pattern of aberrant metacognition of agency as 
patients with schizophrenia (Metcalfe et al., 2012), thus complementing phenomenological data showing 
nearly equivalent levels of distorted volition in these groups during response to suggestion and passivity 
symptoms, respectively (Polito et al., 2015). Relative to controls, insensitivity to lag manipulations was 
smaller in highly suggestible individuals (d=0.67) than in patients with schizophrenia (ds=0.96-1.17; 
Metcalfe et al., 2012); however, Bayesian analyses indicated that the available data were inconclusive 
regarding whether these effects are comparable, thereby precluding any firm conclusions regarding their 
(dis)similarity (Dienes, 2014). Moreover, qualitative effect size differences might be attributable to the 
longer cursor lags in the latter study (250-500ms; Metcalfe et al., 2012) compared to those in the current 
study (50-100ms). Patients with schizophrenia also significantly overestimated their performance 
compared with controls, whereas highly suggestible individuals did not; these results suggest that patients 
exhibit a broad deficit in metacognition whereas aberrant metacognition in highly suggestible individuals 
may be specific to the sense of agency. Further independent evidence for differences between these 
groups comes from data showing that patients with schizophrenia display attenuated or normal hypnotic 
suggestibility (Frischholz, Lipman, Braun, & Sachs, 1992) and that the majority of highly suggestible 
individuals have a healthy cognitive profile (Parris, 2017; Terhune & Cardeña, 2015). Nevertheless, the 
shared response patterns of these two groups indicate that highly suggestible individuals may provide a 
valuable model for distortions in the sense of agency (Polito et al., 2015; Terhune et al., in press; Walsh et 
al., 2015) and are consistent with preliminary research linking hypnotic suggestibility to schizotypy 
(Connors et al., 2014; Gruzelier et al., 2004), which is similarly characterized by aberrant sense of agency 
(Moore & Bravin, 2015). Further research is required to characterize the associations between schizotypy 
and hypnotic suggestibility and the extent to which distortions in the sense of agency in these different 
populations have distinct and shared mechanisms.  
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